1 Introduction Bernanke and Gertler (1989) showed that nancial conditions of rms and households may constitute an important determinant of economic uctuations. In particular, they showed that nancial conditions of borrowers in combination with agency problems have the power to accelerate macroeconomic uctuations. Moreover, the aggregate eects may be asymmetric because the agency problem binds only on the down side. The results of this paper provide a micro parallel to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . We nd that agency problems and volatility are intimately linked, and use this relationship to shed light on the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility smiles.
The asymmetric relation between returns and volatility, known as the volatility smirk or asymmetric volatility smile , was rst identied by Black (1976) and tested by Christie (1982) and Nelson (1991) . In this paper, we identify a link between the stochastic volatility smirk and agency conicts. The actions of improperly supervised management might lead to higher risk in several ways. For instance, a manager of a company that is close to bankruptcy might decide to invest in a high risk project in an attempt to save the company and their position. Consequently, there would be an endogenous relationship between falling stock prices and an increase in the risk of bankruptcy. These and similar examples would seem to be a trivial manifestation of the agency conict that leads to a volatility smirk.
In this paper, the mechanism leading to stochastic volatility is dierent. We show that the stochastic volatility smirk is a fundamental property of the optimal contract that solves the agency conict. In this model the manager does not take any unnecessary risks when the company approaches the default boundary. On the contrary, the optimal contract is incentive compatible and ensures that the manager does not misbehave. The stochastic volatility smirk is shown to be a side eect of the optimal contract solving the agency problem. In this sense, the volatility smirk is shown to be a generic feature of the stock price process of publicly traded companies. Importantly, in contrast to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , we keep the level of agency costs constant, but we allow time variation in leverage. Still, the result is in a sense similar, stochastic volatility is increasing.
In other words, an exogenous shock decreasing the cash ows of rms across the whole economy, will lead to more pronounced uctuations even if the agency costs are held constant.
We use the setting of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) (hereafter DS) . It is shown that a continuous time principal agent model can generate stochastic volatility of stock prices. Stock price volatility turns out to be negatively related with the cash ow process and with the returns on stock prices, such that the lower is the stock price, the higher is its volatility. In the model, when the stock price declines, the draw on the credit line also increases and the company's leverage increases.
Consequently, we obtain a typical asymmetric volatility smirk, which is known as the leverage eect.
Second, we show that the principal agent framework can provide new insights into the nature of stochastic volatility. It is shown that the severity of the agency conict has a critical impact on the magnitude of the volatility smirk. This holds both for the time series and cross-sections of companies. That is, for a given leverage ratio and stock prices a company with great agency conict initially will experience a higher magnitude of stock price volatility. On the other hand, in time series the stock price volatility moves within an interval dened by the cash-ow volatility and a function that is proportional to the agency conict severity. In other words, the severity of the agency conict has an eect on the steepness of the volatility smirk slope. For companies with severe initial agency conict, stochastic volatility may also explode to innity when the stock price falls to zero.
Finally, we suggest a new theoretical argument that may help in distinguishing dierent sources of the volatility smirk. The leverage eect and time-varying risk premium are usually suggested as two main explanations, but they are incompatible with each other. The problem lies in the fact that they assume dierent directions of causality, so that it is dicult to reject any of the explanations based on these two possibilities.
We propose an avenue that may circumvent the problem of causality. Essentially, we advocate a theoretically-motivated instrumental variable which is correlated with the volatility smirk, but should be independent of the time-varying risk premium. The novelty of the approach comes from linking stock price volatility to the severity of the initial agency conict between investors and the management of the company. Using the results of the paper, we redene severity of an agency conict in terms of a particular choice of a company's capital structure. Specically, the management compensation is shown to be proportional to the initial severity of the agency conict.
However, it should be stressed that we consider only companies where the agency conict has been solved. This means that the manager of the company acts in the best interests of equity shareholders and debt holders. The outcome hinges on the assumption that successful companies are able to nance their projects precisely because they are able to mitigate their agency conicts.
The agency conict is endogenously solved by an optimal contract in which management has no incentive to misbehave. The optimal contract is implemented through market securities rather than through other corporate governance solutions. In other words, all the information about the agency conict is reected in the capital structure of the company and in the market prices of the company's securities. Moreover, management compensation is endogenous and cannot be reduced without the risk of violating incentive compatibility constraints.
The problem of identifying companies where the agency conict has been solved may be delicate. However, it should be possible to nd companies that meet a few simple conditions. The sample would need to consist of companies in which the supervisory board did not take any signicant actions against the management. Additionally, major changes in cash ows should be exogenous to the actions of the management. Essentially, these are companies for which major changes in cash ows are not related to poor governance issues or management misbehavior.
If the optimal contract is implemented, we can nd an empirical proxy for the initial severity of the agency conict. In this model, volatility risk is not priced and there are no additional shocks to volatility, but there is one Brownian motion process of the company's cash ow. It would be dicult to imagine any direct connection between the initial severity of the agency conict and any sort of CAPM-type of volatility feedback, as described in Bekaert and Wu (2000) . The severity of an agency conict would seem to be an idiosyncratic factor. Therefore, we feel safe in postulating that the severity of agency conict is independent of the time-varying risk premium.
As it is found that initial agency conicts may be strongly related to the stochastic volatility smirk, we conjecture that we have also found an appropriate candidate for the instrumental variable. This might dierentiate the leverage eect from other potential explanations, such as volatility feedback, time-varying risk premium, or a down-market eect.
We build on a continuous time agency model from DS. Section 2 briey reviews the literature on the source of asymmetric volatility and on dynamic contracting models. Section 3 provides a short description of the DS model. The main results of the paper are given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
This paper has links to several dierent and well established strands of literature. First, we have a predominantly empirical literature dealing with stochastic volatility and the asymmetric relation between stock price volatility and stock returns. Second, we have a vast and predominantly theoretical literature dealing with contract theory. In this paper we show that certain new developments from contract theory may also be useful in resolving some problems in the stochastic volatility literature. Third, the macroeconomics literature has recognized the importance of agency conicts and debt as amplifying mechanisms for business uctuations.
It appears that the stochastic volatility literature has so far been unable to reach a consensus as to the source of the volatility smirk. The direction of causality between volatility and returns has been especially elusive. The reason for this is as follows. The leverage eect assumes that a fall in the value of the stock increases nancial leverage, which makes the stock riskier and leads to higher volatility. Explanations related to the risk premium begin with an assumption that volatility risk is priced. Thus, an anticipated increase in volatility may command an increase in the required return on equity, which results in a concurrent fall in the stock price. Accordingly, the leverage hypothesis contends that returns shocks lead to changes in volatility, while the time-varying risk premium hypothesis assumes that return shocks are the result of changes in volatility. Clearly, the leverage eect and the time-varying risk premium explanation exclude one another.
For example, early papers such as Black (1976) , Christie (1982) and Nelson (1991) attribute the volatility smirk to the leverage eect. Later, Bekaert and Wu (2000) argue that the leverage eect is not sucient as an explanation. They argue that a volatility feedback mechanism provides a better explanation for asymmetric volatility. Moreover, Figlewski and Wang (2000) documents a strong relationship between falling prices and increasing stock volatility. However, they nd many anomalies in this relationship, which leads to the conclusion that it would be more appropriate to call it a down market eect . Finally, using a large panel of merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT stock data, Ericsson, Huang, and Mazzotta (2007) nd additional evidence in support of the leverage eect hypothesis.
Our results can shed some light on cases where it may be dicult to distinguish between the leverage eect and the time-varying risk premium. We provide a link between the primarily empirical literature on the volatility smirk and the growing literature on agency and dynamic contracting.
Several papers have enriched the problem of optimal incentive provision in a dynamic setting using the mathematical tools of optimal control of diusion processes. In general, the methods used in this paper were developed in Sannikov (2007) He and Krishnamurthy (2012) , Homann and Pfeil (2010) and Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) , Piskorski and Westereld (2011) , among others.
An important branch of macroeconomic models is based on the costly state verication notion of Townsend (1979) . The seminal example here is Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , who modied the real business cycle model to account for agency problems. The simple consequence of adding agency problems was to make the Modigliani-Miller theorem inapplicable. Pintus (2011) shows that increasing debt also leads to a higher volatility of macroeconomic uctuations, as in this paper. At the micro level we show how an increase in overall debt can lead to higher volatility.
3 The Model
Optimal Contract
This is an agency model of long term nancial contracting, in which a risk-neutral agent seeks funding from a risk-neutral investor, and where funding is used to nance investment in assets.
The assets will generate risky cash ow with mean µ and volatility σ:
where Z t is a standard Wiener process. The agency problem arises from the fact that the agent can privately observe cash ows {Y t , t > 0}, but the principal does not. The agent reports cash ows Ŷ t , t > 0 to the principal, but may misreport and divert for their own private consumption. The agent can receive at most a fraction, λ, from diverted cash ows, where λ ∈ [0, 1], so that 1 − λ is the dead-weight cost of money laundering . If λ = 0, then diversion does not bring any prots and the agency problem disappears.
The principal receives only the reported cash ow from the agent. Based on the reports and according to the contract, the principal transfers a payo, dI t , to the agent, where the payo process is non-decreasing. The agent's ow of income consists of what is diverted plus the payo, dI t . The only way that the principal can induce the agent to report any positive cash ows is by the threat of terminating the business. Therefore, the contract must specify the time, τ , when the investor terminates cooperation with the agent.
Upon termination of the contract, the agent receives a reservation utility, R, and the investors receive the liquidation value, L. The risk neutral agent is assumed to have subjective time preference rate, γ. The agent's total payo from the contract at time 0 is given by:
Investors are also assumed to be risk neutral. They have unlimited capital and discount received cash ows at the rate, r, such that r < γ. The principal's total payo at time 0 is equal to:
Before time zero, the principal species a contract, (τ, I), consisting of termination time, τ , and payments to the agent, {I t , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ }, based on the reports, Y t . The agent chooses a strategy, C, Y , as a response to the contract, (τ, I).
We present an informal argument for the derivation of the optimal contract. This constraint, in turn, denes the optimal cash transfers to the agent:
These cash transfers and the default boundary keep the agent's continuation value constantly within the interval between R and W 1 . The agent must receive at least a fraction of λ of the promised value for each reported dollar so that there is no incentive to misbehave. In this case, the agent's expected payo consists of transfers from the principal and termination utility:
which implies that the agent's continuation value evolves according to:
Using Ito's Lemma and (3), the principal's expected cash ow will follow according to:
We know that the principal requires an instantaneous total return equal to the discount rate, r.
From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the principal's value function solves the following second-order dierential equation:
with three boundary conditions.
The rst boundary condition is from the agent's minimum compensation, b(R) = L. 
Capital Structure Implementation
The optimal contract is implemented with three standard securities, namely equity, long term debt and credit line. Equity holders receive dividend payments made by the rm. Dividends are paid from the rm's available cash or credit, and are at the discretion of the agent. Long term debt is a consol bond that pays continuous coupons at the rate, x. The coupon rate is r, and the face value of debt is D = x/r. A revolving credit line provides the rm with available credit up to C L .
Balances on the credit line are charged a xed interest rate, r c . If the balance on the credit line exceeds C L , the rm defaults.
The optimal contract is implemented with a capital structure in which the agent holds equity for a fraction, λ, of the rm and the credit line has interest rate, r c = γ. It is incentive compatible for the agent to refrain from stealing, and to use the project cash ows to pay the debt coupons and credit line before issuing dividends. After the credit line is fully repaid, all excess cash ows are issued as dividends. Under this capital structure, the agent's expected future payo, W t , is determined by the current draw, M t , on the credit line:
Security Market Values
The market value of long term debt, credit line and outside equity is conditional on the draw on the credit line or, equivalently, on the agent's continuation value, W t . This occurs because the larger is the draw on the credit line, the higher is the probability of default. The value of equity per share 1 is equal to:
where dDiv = 1 λ dI represents the value of dividends paid out both to the outside equity holders and to the manager.
Volatility Smirk for Time Series and Cross-Sections of Companies

Volatility Smirk
At time 0, if debt is risky, the value of equity is equal to (6). There might also be interest in the evolution of the stock price, that is, how it behaves at time t > 0. This is straightforward as we just need to condition on F Z t , and integrate from t to τ rather than from 0 to τ . Dene a new function:
We can use S (W ) to investigate the properties of the stock price volatility in the DS model, after describing the function F . The following lemma is a direct generalization of Lemma D from DS. 
(ii) F satises
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following proposition states that an optimal contract between the investors and the entrepreneur may induce stochastic volatility in stock prices and a volatility smirk. , the volatility of equity is at. Therefore, stock price volatility, σ E , in this model exhibits the property called a volatility smirk.
Proof. The stock price function, S (W ), is a special case of F (W t ), from Lemma 4.1. We observe that, in this case, k = − 1 λ and f (W t ) = 0. Using these facts and Ito's Lemma, we can derive the dynamics of (7):
The Ito dynamics of S give the stock price volatility:
We need to describe some of the properties of the function, S. From stochastic representation, we can show that S is increasing in W . Lemma A.1 from Appendix A shows that function S is concave in W . Thus, for every t, we have:
Additionally, from (5), it can be shown that:
Summarizing, the volatility of the stock price is increasing in M :
that is, increasing in the draw on the credit line. The agent has to draw on the credit line when the cash ows are not sucient to repay the coupon on the long term debt. This also increases a rm's leverage and credit risk. Altogether, it means that, when the cash ows fall, stock price volatility increases. This leads to an asymmetric stochastic volatility smirk, with greater slope in the direction of negative cash ows.
An asymmetric stochastic volatility smirk is dened in terms of the derivative with respect to M , that is, a draw on the credit line. We could also take the derivative of σ E with respect to the continuation value, W , which would only change the sign of the relation:
This arises because the continuation value of the agent, W , and the draw on the credit line, M , always move in opposite directions. This is intuitive, as the agent has to draw on the credit line only if cash ows are not sucient to cover the costs of long term debt. The continuation value, W , will also fall. In other words, the higher is the continuation value of the agent, the lower will be the stock price volatility for the principal.
Volatility Smirk for Time Series of Companies
It is known that the rm's capital structure is such that the payout policy is incentive compatible for the manager. Thus, it is optimal for the manager to pay out dividends only when the credit line is fully paid down. What about outside equity holders? Would they prefer a dierent strategic default policy, such as an alternative payout policy? Could the rm raise new equity capital to delay default?
For each dollar paid out in dividends, the outside equity holders receive only 1 − λ. Using the rst derivative of S(W t ), we might estimate the impact of drawing one dollar more on the value of equity, S(W t ). First, we note that the increased draw on the credit line changes the value of outside equity holders by (1 − λ) ∂ ∂M S(W t ). Thus, equity holders will not benet from paying themselves additional dividends at the expense of a higher draw on credit line, unless:
or equivalently:
When debt is risky, L < D + C L , the above relationship holds with equality for M t = 0. This means that equity holders have no incentive to alter the rm's payout policy.
On the other hand, the company might decide to pay down some of the draw on the credit line by raising new capital through an equity issue. All such capital must come from outside shareholders, who will not buy any new shares unless:
That is, one dollar that is used to pay down the draw on the credit line must amount to more than a one dollar increase in the value of the equity 2 . Combining the two inequalities gives:
Surprisingly, we may also nd that the two inequalities above place constraints on the value of stochastic volatility. This is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.3. When debt is risky, the magnitude of stock price volatility, σ E , belongs in the interval:
Proof. Here we use the previously stated inequality (10). From the fact that W t is a linear function of M t , W t = W 1 − λM t , we observe that:
Then we substitute this formula into (10) and multiply by σ to obtain:
which yields the the result:
Empirically, λ corresponds to the amount of shares held by the management of the company. If λ is close to 0, the agency problem also disappears and we observe neither stochastic volatility of stock prices nor a volatility smirk. However, if λ tends to 1, then:
Obviously, according to this model, stock volatility, σ E , would also explode to innity.
Volatility Smirk for Cross-Sections of Companies
Empirically, it is dicult to disentangle the leverage eect from the time-varying risk premium.
However, we can suggest a novel and testable prediction that may assist in interpreting uncertainty and the leverage eect, not in the time series of stock returns but in their cross-sections. Specically, we show that the magnitude of the volatility smirk increases with the parameter, λ. 
This observation provides an empirically testable fact. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) showed that λ is an important parameter for the implementation of the optimal contract, as it is a fraction of the cash ows that the manager can divert. For obvious reasons, it is dicult to observe stolen money. Fortunately, in this model the manager does not need to steal. The optimal capital structure guarantees that the manager receives the fraction, λ, of cash ows in the form of dividends. That is, in the optimum, λ denes the number of shares that the manager holds.
Therefore, Proposition 4.4 suggests we should observe that the stock price of companies in which management holds a larger stake exhibits a more pronounced volatility smirk.
Another advantage of this measure is that it should assist in clarifying dierent interpretations of the asymmetric volatility. The parameter, λ, as a measure is clearly independent of timevarying risk, volatility feedback or a down market eect , as all of these measures refer to time series properties. Consequently, we might use λ as an instrumental variable to disentangle the inuence of the leverage eect on asymmetric volatility from other eects.
Conclusions
The main contributions of this paper are insights into the potential determinants of the asymmetric relationship between volatility and stock returns. We showed that the dynamic principal agent model can show a pattern of stock price volatility behavior that is usually attributed to the human component. Under a standard Brownian motion, the prices and behavior of securities are symmetric because the normal probability distribution of the Wiener process favors neither positive nor negative uctuations. In this model, we can observe a volatility smirk, with an asymmetric grin in the direction of a higher draw on the credit line and negative cumulative cash ows. However, it
is not due to investors becoming increasingly nervous, but rather as a side eect of the contractual solution to the principal-agent problem.
We also showed that the magnitude of the volatility smirk increased with the severity of the agency conict in the rm, both in the time series and in cross-sections of companies. In the context of this model, the severity of agency conict can be observed indirectly as it is proportional to the number of the company's shares held by the manager. This led to the proposal of a new instrumental variable that should help to disentangle the leverage eect from other mechanisms inuencing asymmetric volatility. In particular, we hypothesized that the number of stock shares held by the manager would be positively correlated with the magnitude of the volatility smirk.
Therefore, a number of stock shares held by the manager, as a proxy for the severity of the agency conict, may serve as an instrumental variable in tests for the source of asymmetric volatility in stock returns. We can show that H u is a martingale using the law of iterated expectations. Assume that t < u < t < τ , and we need to show that E E H|F which proves that H u is a martingale, so its drift must be equal to zero.
